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THE OPENING AND CLOSING
OF MUNICIPAL STREETS IN TENNESSEE
AND SELECTED LEGAL POTHOLES
AND PATCHES IN BETWEEN
Sidney D. Hemsley, Legal Consultant

I. INTRODUCTION
Few municipal functions touch as many people,
involve as much expense, and generate as much
public concern and controversy as municipal streets.
But the law governing how municipal streets are
created and closed, and a multitude of other issues
that arise over the use of those streets, is not
generally well known by many public ofﬁcials and
citizens. For that reason, this publication analyzes
the law governing a number of questions that apply
to municipal streets in Tennessee, including
• What are municipal streets?
• What are the ways municipal streets are created?
• Is a municipal street that has been platted but
never constructed still a street?
• What does a municipality “own” when a street
is created?
• What is the difference between a municipality’s
governmental powers and its proprietary powers
over its streets, and why does it matter?
• Are municipalities liable for their dangerous and
defective streets?
• What right do utilities have to put their pipes,
wire, and other utility infrastructure in the
streets, and what happens to such rights when
streets are closed?
• Are utilities required to obtain a franchise from
the municipality as a condition of their use of
municipal streets?

• Under what conditions can utilities be made to
remove their facilities from municipal streets and
who pays for the utility relocation?
• How is the width of municipal streets
determined?
• How do municipalities close streets?
• How much discretion do municipalities have
in closing streets?
• Must municipalities give notice to other
governmental agencies or property owners
that they intend to close a street?
• Who owns municipal streets after they
are closed?
• What right do abutting and other property
owners have to use closed streets?
This publication is designed for use by both
attorneys and “laymen.” To that end, it has been
kept as simple as possible without neglecting
important legal principles on the subject. Cases
supporting legal principles in the publication are,
with a few obvious exceptions, cited in full each
time they appear.

II. STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
OF STREETS
The words “streets,” “roads,” and “highways” are
often used interchangeably in conversation, and
even in some statutes and various legal treatises
on streets. In addition, those individual terms may
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vary from statute to statute and overlap in some.
Probably the most accurate description of the
word “street” is found in Tennessee Code Annotated
(T.C.A.) § 54-4-201, which establishes the state
street aid program:

T.C.A. Title 1, Chapter 3, contains rules of statutory
construction for words for the application of the
Code. The word “street” is not deﬁned therein, but
T.C.A. §1-3-105, provides the following: “As used in
this code, unless the context otherwise requires”

(3) “street” includes streets, highways,
avenues, boulevards, publicly owned rightsof-way, bridges, tunnels, public parking
areas or other public ways dedicated to
public use and maintained for general
public travel lying within a municipality’s
corporate boundaries…

(11) “Highway” includes public bridges and
may be held equivalent to the words “county
way,” “county road” or “state road.”

For the purpose of municipal planning regulations
under T.C.A. Title 13, Chapter 3, a “Street” or
“streets” means and includes streets, avenues,
boulevards, roads, lanes, alleys, and other ways
[T.C.A. § 13-4-301(3)].

III. CREATION OF MUNICIPAL STREETS

T.C.A. § 55-8-101 contains the “Rules of the Road”
for the operation of motor vehicles in Tennessee,
and deﬁnes both “street” and “highway” as “the
entire width between boundary lines of every way
when any part thereof is open to the use of the
public for purposes of vehicular trafﬁc.” [subsections
(22) and (61)] In addition, it deﬁnes “sidewalk” as
“that portion of a street between the curb lines,
or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent
property lines, intended for use of pedestrians.”
The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act,
provides that
(a) Immunity from suit of a governmental
entity is removed for any injury caused by
a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition
of any street, alley, sidewalk or highway,
owned and controlled by such governmental
entity. “Street” or “highway” includes trafﬁc
control devices [T.C.A. § 29-20-203].
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(27) “Road” includes public bridges and may
be held equivalent to the words “county
way,” “county road” or “state road.”

BROAD MUNICIPAL DISCRETION
Generally, property owners have little legal voice
in the location, establishment, construction,
and abandonment of city streets, and the courts
will not interfere with municipal decisions in
those areas absent fraud or a clear abuse of
discretion [Georgia v. Chattanooga, 4 Tenn.
App. 674 (1927); Brimer v. Municipality of Jefferson
City, 216 S.W.2d 1 (1948); Swafford v. City of
Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987);
W. G. Wilkins v. Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans
Railroad Co., 110 Tenn. 423 (1903); Sweetwater
Valley Memorial Park v. City of Sweetwater,
372 S.W.2d 168 (1963); Cash & Carry Lumber
Company, Inc. v. Olgiati, 385 S.W.2d 115 (1964)].
It has also been held that municipalities have the
discretion as to what forms of public travel are
permissible within a right-of-way. In Blackburn
v. Dillon, 225 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. 1946), the width
of the right-of-way easement was clearly 40 feet,
but the city had the discretion within that
easement to determine what forms of public travel
were allowed (in this case a sidewalk).
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METHODS OF CREATION
It is said in Henry County v. Summers,
547 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tenn. App. 1976) that
Unless a passageway has been created
a public way in some manner known to the
law, such as by act of the public authorities,
or the express dedication by the owner, or by
an implied dedication by means of the use by
the public and acceptance by them with the
intention of the owner that the use become
public, or by adverse user for a period of 20
years continuously creating a prescriptive
right, it is not a public way [At 250].
There are apparently six “manners of creation”
known to the law.
1. County roads automatically become city
streets upon the incorporation of the
city or by annexation of territory into the
city. [See 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations,
Section 1661; Jordan v. City of Cleveland,
255 S.W. 377 (1922).]
2. Streets designated by the state as state
highways, or constructed by the state or
any political subdivision of the state, are
city streets.
T.C.A. Title 54, Chapter 5, gives the Tennessee
Department of Transportation the authority to
construct state highways, including interstate
highways, through municipalities, or to designate
existing city streets as part of the state highway
system. It has the sole discretion over the selection
of streets that become state highways. [Especially
see T.C.A. §§ 54-5-201 et seq.]
In either case, state highways running through
municipalities are simply municipal streets over

which state trafﬁc is routed, and the municipality
retains its police powers over such streets.
[See Collier v. Baker, 27 S.W.2d 1085 (1930);
Brimer v. Municipality of Jefferson City,
216 S.W.2d 1 (1948); Paris v. Paris-Henry County
Utility District, 340 S.W.2d 885 (1960)]. While
a county or other political subdivision of the state
can own easements for various purposes within
a municipality, any street constructed by a county
or other political subdivision of the state inside
a municipality, or any county or other political
subdivision property inside a municipality
generally opened to public travel, is a municipal
street [Callahan v. Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501
(Tenn. App. 1954), Rutherford County v.
Murfreesboro, 309 S.W.2d 778 (Tenn. 1957);
Thompson v. Memphis, 66 S.W. 990 (Tenn. 1934);
Brimer v. Municipality of Jefferson City,
216 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1948)].
T.C.A. §§ 54-5-207–54-5-210 provide for the
acquisition of land by a municipality (at the
expense of the state) for the purpose of the
development and construction of interstate
connections. But T.C.A. § 55-5-210 provides that
even where the municipality fails in that job,
“nothing in §§ 54-5-207–210 shall be construed
as otherwise changing the character or legal status
of streets in any way and the distinctions heretofore
made in this code between streets and highways are
continued in full force and effect.”
3. Formal dedication and acceptance. This
method contemplates a formal offer, and
a public acceptance of, the dedication.
[See Smith v. Black, 547 S.W.2d 947 (Tenn.
App. 1977)]. It is also said in 10A McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, Section 33.30, that one
of the ways that shows intent to dedicate land
to public use is “recitals in a deed in which the
rights of the public are recognized.” For that
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reason, formal dedication and acceptance of
streets includes their formal purchase.
A statutory method for the formal dedication and
acceptance of subdivision streets is found in
T.C.A. §§13-4-301 et seq. It is provided in
T.C.A. § 13-4-104 that whenever the planning
commission has adopted the plan of the
municipality (or any part thereof)
•

“[N]o street…or other public way…” shall be
constructed or authorized until its location and
extent have been approved by the planning
commission; unless

•

The governing body of the municipality overrides
the disapproval of the planning commission by
a vote of a majority of its entire membership.

Likewise, T.C.A. § 13-4-307 provides that once the
subdivision platting jurisdiction of the municipal
planning commission attaches, a municipality “shall
not…accept, lay out, open, improve, grade, pave, or
light any street, or lay or authorize water mains or
sewers or connections to be laid in any street within
the municipality, unless”
•

The street has been accepted or opened as
or has otherwise received the legal status
of a public street prior to the attachment of
the planning commission’s subdivisions
jurisdiction; or,

•

The street corresponds in its location and
lines with a street shown on a subdivision
plat approved by the planning commission
or with a street plat made and adopted by
the commission; or

•

The municipal governing body locates and
constructs a street or accepts a street, provided
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that it ﬁrst submits the ordinance or other
measure for the location and construction,
or acceptance of the street, to the planning
commission for its approval, and if it is
disapproved by the planning commission,
receives the vote of a majority of the entire
membership of the municipal governing body.
4. Implied dedication and acceptance. This
conduct of the landowner and of the municipality
is weighed to determine whether a street has
been dedicated and accepted under this method.
It is said in Roger v. Sain, 679 S.W.2d 450
(Tenn. App. 1984), that
It has long been established that private
land can be implicitly dedicated to use as
a public road. [Citation omitted.] When an
implied dedication is claimed, the focus
of the inquiry is whether the landowner
intended to dedicate the land to a public
use. [Citations omitted.] The proof on the
issue of intent to dedicate may be inferred
from surrounding facts and circumstances,
including the overt acts of the owner [Citation
omitted] [At 452-53] [Emphasis is mine].
Citing an earlier case that quoted from Elliot on
Roads and Streets, Section 92, the Court continued
Among the factors which indicate an intent
to dedicate are the landowner opens
a road to public travel [Citations omitted.];
acquiescence in the use of the road as
a public road, [Citations omitted.]; and the
fact that the public has used the road for an
extended period of time. [Citations omitted.]
While dedication is not dependent on
duration of the use, extended use is
a circumstance tending to show an intent
to dedicate. [Citations omitted.] Finally,
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an intent to dedicate is inferable when the
roadway is repaired and maintained by the
public [At 453].
It was also said in Reeves v. Perkins, 590 S.W.2d
233, (Tenn. App. 1973) that, “Dedication may arise
from the failure of the owner to object to user
by the public. A highway may be established in
this manner” [At 234-35]. In that case a certain
landowner erected a fence at both ends of a road.
The county road commissioner argued that the
road was a public road. Holding in favor of the
road commissioner, the court pointed to proof
from witnesses in the area and county highway
department commissioners and employees that
…establishes the road has been in existence
and used by anyone who wished to use
it since the 1920s. The use included foot
travel, horseback, wagon, automobile and
pick-up trucks. No owner of the property
ever fenced off either of the two ends of
the road nor did any previous owner object
to or restrict the use of the road. A former
county highway commission and some county
highway department employees testiﬁed
that the county had graded and ditched the
road several times since 1939. One witness
traveled the road in a pick-up truck about
two or three years prior to the suit.
The road was used by plaintiff Huber Patty
while a Star Route mail carrier in 1926
because it was the better road from Sardis to
Lexington [At 234-35].
The abutting landowner never objected to the use of
the road during that period.
Apparently there may also be a formal dedication
and an implied acceptance of a street easement.

The approval and recording of a subdivision plat
does not constitute acceptance of the subdivision
streets, but probably does constitute formal
dedication of the streets. If the city fails to
formally accept the dedication, its conduct in the
use of the street may constitute implied acceptance.
[See Smith v. Black, 547 S.W.2d 947 (Tenn. App.
1977); Hackett v. Smith County, 807 S.W.2d 695
(Tenn. App. 1990); West Meade Homeowners
Association v. WPMC, 788 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn.
App. 1989).]
Some of the acts that indicate implied acceptance
of the street on the part of the city include
tolerance of common use by the public, construction
and maintenance by city and other utilities of
installations in the street, listing on an ofﬁcial
street map, use of the street by school buses, law
enforcement agencies, and absence of the street from
the tax rolls and special assessments. [See State ex.
Rel. Matthews v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville,
679 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1984); Hackett v. Smith
County, 807 S.W.2d 695 (Tenn. App. 1990); West
Meade Homeowners Association v. WPMC, Inc.,
788 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn. App. 1989).]
In State ex rel. Matthews v. Metro. Government of
Nashville, 679 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1984), a bank
obstructed Printers’ Alley with garbage cans and
dumpsters, and the owner of an abutting building
asked for a writ of mandamus requiring the police
to remove those obstructions, arguing that it was
a public alley. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld
the issuance of the writ of mandamus by the trial
court, reasoning that the alley had been accepted
by the city. In this case little beyond public use
and the city’s utility location supported the Court’s
determination that the alley was a public alley.
Not surprisingly, there is little direct proof
of the extent of public use of the alley in
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the years immediately following the offer of
dedication in 1881. The alley has been used
by pedestrians to go between Fourth Avenue
and Printers’ Alley for many years. The alley
appears in atlases dated 1889, 1908, and
1928. Although not speciﬁcally labeled as
a public alley on those atlases, it is shown in
a manner, which is consistent with its status
as a public alley. The reasonable inference to
be drawn from the facts and circumstances
above is that public use of the alley was
signiﬁcant in the early years following
dedication. That public use constitutes
a public acceptance of the offer of
dedication. Our conclusion derives support
from the proof relating to the use of the
alley by the public and the treatment of the
alley by the Metropolitan Government in
subsequent years.
Pedestrians have continued to use the
alley as a walkway. Although many of the
pedestrians are from the J.C. Bradford
Building, some are from the Ambrose
Building and others are not associated with
either building. Vehicles have made use of
the alley to make deliveries and to park.
There is no proof in the record that the
Metropolitan Government has done any
maintenance work on the alley. However,
the proof clearly establishes that in other
respects the city has treated the alley as
a public alley. In 1965, the city passed an
ordinance adopting an “Ofﬁcial Street and
Alley Acceptance and Maintenance Map”
which shows the alley as Public Alley No. 17.
In addition, no taxes have been assessed on
the property. The Department of Public Works
gave the Nashville Electric Service permission
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to locate a utility vault underneath the alley
[At 949].
No speciﬁc time limit triggers an implied dedication.
In Nicely v. Nicely, 232 S.W.2d 421 (Ct. App. 1949),
an implied dedication arose from ﬁve years use,
along with other circumstances, including road
grading with public funds. In Payton v. Richardson,
356 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. App. 1962), the Court
declared that, “The manner of its use is more
material than the length of time the use
has continued” [At 291].
A landowner’s grant to a small number or certain
class of travelers of a right to use his land as a
passageway generally will not constitute a grant of
an implied dedication. It is said in 11A McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, Section 33.32, that
…If the user by the public does not exclude
the owner’s private rights, such user will
ordinarily be regarded as merely permissive
and a mere permissive use of property by
third persons in connection with a private
use of the property for the same purposes
does not usually show an intent to dedicate.
Thus, an intent to dedicate is not shown by
the act of the owner of land in establishing
a private way for his or her own convenience
or for the convenience of his or her
customers, even though the way is also used
by the public generally without objection by
the owner. Similarly, an intention to dedicate
will not be inferred from the public’s use
of railroad company’s land if that use is
consistent with the public use for which the
railroad company holds the property.
5. Prescription. A street easement arises by
prescription when a person, including
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a government, uses another person’s land as
a street openly and notoriously under a claim of
right for an uninterrupted period of 20 years.
It is said in Morgan County v. Goans, 198 S.W.
69 (Tenn. 1917), that, “Twenty years’ adverse
possessor will establish a right-of-way either
in the public or in private persons” [At 69].
The claim of right and acceptance of the street
by the government can be shown by public
maintenance of the street. [Also see Callahan
v. Town of Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1954); Morgan County v. Goans, 138 Tenn.
381, 198 S.W. 69 (1917); City of Knoxville v.
Sprankle, 9 Tenn. App. 218 (1928); Lewisburg v.
Emerson, 5 Tenn. App. 127 (1927).]
In Morgan County v. Goans, 198 S.W. 69 (1917),
a road ran from the main Wartburg Road to
Ms. Goan’s place through Duncan’s land. There
was evidence to show that the road had been in
existence since 1884, and had been traveled by
the public since that time as a matter of right. The
county had never maintained the road, but its use
by the public for more than 20 years was sufﬁcient
to create a prescriptive public right in the road.
6. The laws of eminent domain, and other
statutes. Land can be taken for streets under
various laws of Tennessee that authorize the
taking of land by public entities by eminent
domain. [General state eminent domain
statutes: T.C.A. §§ 29-17-201, 29-17-801;
public works projects: T.C.A. § 9-21-107;
streets: T.C.A. §§ 7-31-107–110; controlled
access highways: T.C.A. § 54-16-104. In
addition, most municipal private act, general
law, and home rule charters include a broad
power of condemnation. With respect to the
general law charters, see T.C.A. § 6-19-101

(manager-commission); T.C.A. § 6-2-201
(mayor-aldermanic); and T.C.A. § 6-33-101
(modiﬁed city manager-council)].
It was held in an unreported case that where
a municipality chooses to exercise its power of
eminent domain under its charter, it must follow
the formal procedures prescribed in the charter
for the exercise of that power [City of Johnson
City v. Campbell, 2002 WL 112311 (Tenn. Ct. App.)].
T.C.A. § 7-31-101 authorizes municipalities to
construct streets in annexed areas.
The Tennessee Department of Transportation, and
counties and cities, separately or by state-local
agreements, are authorized to construct industrial
highways. Counties and cities can apparently
construct such highways inside, and in some
cases outside, their boundaries. It is said in
T.C.A. § 55-5-406(b), that
Notwithstanding § 54-5-406 [which limits
state participation in the construction of
industrial highways under the conditions
set out therein], cities and counties within
this state may and are hereby authorized
to use any funds available to them for the
construction and maintenance of industrial
highways, roads, and streets within their
boundaries or within, or adjacent to, or in
close proximity to any industrial sites or
parks owned or partially owned by them,
or lands owned or held by them for industrial
use, when, in the opinion of a majority
of the members of the governing body of
any city or county within this state, the
same will facilitate industrial development
or expansion.
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However, under the doctrine that roads built in
a municipality by the state or its political
subdivisions are city streets, presumably industrial
highways built by the state or a county within
a municipality are also city streets.
CREATION OF ALLEYS AND SIDEWALKS GOVERNED
BY SAME LAWS GOVERNING CREATION OF STREETS
An alley is a narrow street, and the establishment
of public alleys and thoroughfares is governed by
the same rules that apply to streets. [See Lee v. Seiz,
13 Tenn. App. 260 (1930); Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Dickson, 173 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. App. 1941);
State ex rel. Matthews v. Metropolitan Government
of Nashville and Davidson County, 679 S.W.2d 946
(Tenn. 1984).]

IV. SELECTED LEGAL POTHOLES AND
PATCHES INVOLVING STREETS
MUNICIPALITIES USUALLY DO NOT OWN STREETS
Municipalities usually do not own their streets in
the sense of owning the underlying fee. There is a
presumption that the abutting property owners own
the underlying fee to the center line of the street,
and the municipality has only a transportation
easement or right-of-way across the property for
the use of public travel. [See Hamilton County v.
Rape, 47 S.W. 416 (1898); Patton v. Chattanooga,
65 S.W. 414 (1901).] However, property acquired
by the state or any of its political subdivisions for
interstates and controlled access highways must be
acquired in fee simple [T.C.A. § 54-16-204].
MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER OVER STREETS
The power to control streets and highways rests
primarily in the state, which power the legislature
can delegate to municipalities. [See City of
Chattanooga v. Tennessee Electric Power Co.,
112 S.W.2d 385 (1938).] Generally, a municipality
must exercise the police power delegated to it
by the legislature in the manner directed by the
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legislature [Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door, 640
S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)].
It has been held that “very broad powers of
regulation, and wide discretion, in the exercise
of the police power, are held to be vested in
municipalities in touching the use of its streets.”
[See Steil v. City of Chattanooga, 152 S.W.2d 624,
626 (Tenn. 1941).] It has also been held that the
courts will not interfere with the exercise of that
discretionary power except in the case of fraud
or clear abuse of power. Those police powers also
extend to state highways running through cities.
[See Collier v. Baker, 27 S.W.2d 1085 (1930);
Blackburn v. Dillon, 225 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. 1949).]
It is also the law generally that where private
activities near, as well as in, a street right-ofway pose a hazard to street trafﬁc, a municipality
can prohibit or regulate that activity. Indeed, the
police power generally pertains to the right of
a municipality to impose restrictions on the use
of private property through reasonable laws and
ordinances that are necessary to secure the safety,
health, good order, peace, comfort, protection and
convenience of the state or a municipality. That
right is broad and well-established [S & P Enters,
Inc. v. City of Memphis, 672 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1983); Rivergate Wine & Liquors, Inc. v. City of
Goodlettsville, 647 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. 1983); PennDixie Cement Corporation v. Kingsport, 225 S.W.2d
270 (Tenn. 1949); Miller v. Memphis, 178 S.W.2d 382
(Tenn. 1944)].
An important distinction is made in City of Paris v.
Paris-Henry County Public Utility District,
340 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1960), between the authority
a franchise gives a public utility over municipal
rights-of-way and the authority a municipality has
under its police powers to control the conditions
of the exercise of that franchise. [For a detailed
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discussion on franchises in municipal streets,
see VI. FRANCHISES TO USE STREETS in this
publication.] In that case the question was whether
a utility district could make excavations in the
city’s streets without complying with the city’s
ordinance governing such excavations. The city
had by ordinance 295 granted to the utility district
a franchise to lay, construct and maintain its gas
lines under the city’s streets. Following the utility
district’s failure to restore streets it had excavated
for that purpose, the City of Paris, by ordinance
316 required any person making a street excavation
to obtain a permit and pay a permit fee to the city.
The utility district argued that ordinance 316
was unconstitutional and an impairment of
a contract under Article I, § 20, of the Tennessee
Constitution (“No man’s…property [shall be] taken,
or applied to public use, without the consent of
her representative, or without just compensation
being made thereof.”) The basis of its argument
was that ordinance 295 provided that utility
district’s agreement to the contract would be the
consideration and “in lieu of all other fees, charges
and licenses which the City might impose for the
rights and privileges herein granted.” The Court
rejected the utility district’s argument.
It was true, said the Court, that when the utility
district accepted the franchise, it became binding
upon the city, and that the franchise gave the utility
district the right to use the city’s streets to install
its pipes, and that the contract right created by
the franchise could not be revoked or impaired by
the city. However, continued the Court, the utility
district’s right was
…subject to regulation by the City, acting
in its governmental capacity under the police
power, delegated to it by the State, to

regulate and control its streets for the
public health and safety. Such power is
broad and cannot be limited by contract
[Citations omitted].
Ordinances 295 and 316 were talking about two
different fees, declared the Court:
The fees for permits under ordinance 316,
however, are not “fees, charges or licenses”
imposed by the City, for any “rights or
privileges” granted by ordinance 295. The
latter class of “fees,” etc., were a matter of
contract, or rather were forbidden by the
contract, between Defendant and the City
acting in its proprietary capacity. Lewis v.
Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 162 Tenn. 268,
40 S.W.2d 409.
But the former class of fees, fees for permits
under ordinance 316, are exacted by the City,
acting in its governmental capacity, as an
incident to its enforcement of police power
regulation, and were not, and could not be,
controlled or limited by contract [At 889]
[Citations omitted] [Emphasis is mine].
The Court also held ordinance 316 to be a valid
police power regulation, reasoning that
Such right [of the utility district to use
the city’s streets under the franchise], was
subject to regulation by the City, acting in its
governmental capacity under the police power,
delegated to it by the State, to regulate
and control its streets for the public health
and safety. Such power is broad and cannot
be limited by contract [At 888] [Citations
omitted] [Emphasis is mine].
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The fee imposed by ordinance 316 was also
reasonable, declared the Court: “It is not shown that
these fees will amount to more than the cost
of enforcing this police regulation.
‘Mathematical nicety is not exacted in cases where
a license fee is charged as an incident to the
enforcement of a police power ordinance’ “
[At 889] [Citations omitted].
The question of whether a police power regulation
is reasonable requires a two-prong test: First, the
regulation must bear some relationship to
a legitimate interest protectable by the police
powers; second, the regulation may not be
unreasonable or oppressive [Rivergate Wine and
Liquors, Inc., v. City of Goodlettsville, above].
STATUS OF UNOPENED STREETS
West Meade Homeowners Association v. WPMC,
778 S.W.2d 365 (1989), indicates that the formal
dedication and acceptance of a street may occur
without the actual construction of a street. There
a recorded plat showed Cornwall Drive to run
between two certain lots on WPMC’s property.
However, the paved portion of Cornwall Drive
ended in a cul-de-sac that left an intervening
space between the cul-de-sac and WPMC’s property
upon which no street had been built, but which
showed up on the plat as a dedicated right-of-way.
WPMC wanted to develop its property and to use
the intervening space as an ingress and egress to
the development. WPMC argued that the City of
Nashville had accepted the right-of-way. The City
of Nashville, itself joined the developer in arguing
that the city had accepted the right-of-way. The
Homeowner’s Association argued that the right-ofway on the plat between the cul-de-sac and WPMC’s
property had not been accepted by the city or had
since been abandoned.
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The Court held in favor of WPMC, agreeing that the
city had accepted the right-of-way in dispute. It
reiterated the well-settled law that establishment
of a right-of-way requires both a dedication
and acceptance. The dedication in this case was
undisputed; it appeared on the recorded plat.
A dedication could be formally or informally
accepted, and in this case the city had at least
informally accepted it, declared the Court,
reasoning that
The evidence of public acceptance in the
present record is similar to that relied upon
to ﬁnd public acceptance in Matthews. The
disputed portion of Cornwall Drive is included
on the “Ofﬁcial Street and Alley Acceptance
and Maintenance Map.” In addition, no taxes
have been paid on the right-of-way and the
Nashville Electric Service has erected and
maintained utility poles within the right-ofway. In Matthews this evidence was sufﬁcient
for the court to ﬁnd public acceptance of an
offer of dedication and we believe that it is
sufﬁcient to make the same ﬁnding in this
case [At 366].
There had been no abandonment of the
right-of-way by the city, concluded the Court,
because the Nashville Electrical Service used it
for its utility poles.
Presumably, the same rule applies to rights-of-way
reﬂected on county road maps where territory is
incorporated or annexed by a municipality.
But it does not necessarily follow that the public
has a right to use a street that has been dedicated
and accepted but upon which no construction
of a “street” has actually occurred. The Court in
West Meade Homeowners Association v. WPMC,
778 S.W.2d 365 (1989) pointed out in reply to the
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homeowner’s association demand for an injunction
to stop WPMC’s development that the municipal
planning commission had the sole and exclusive
power to approve or disapprove subdivision plats for
real estate developments, and that before a subdivision could be developed on WPMC’s property, the
Metropolitan Planning Commission had to approve
a subdivision plan. No such application had been
approved or even made. For that reason the demand
for an injunction was premature. While the Court
did not mention the disputed part of Cornwall Drive
in connection with the plat, apparently if that
part of Cornwall Drive was to be used as a street it
would have been required to appear on the plat of
the development. In addition, a municipality has
the right to determine what kind of public travel is
permitted on its streets [Blackburn v. Dillon,
225 S.W.2d 46 (1946)].
MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY FOR UNSAFE AND
DEFECTIVE STREETS
Tennessee municipalities are liable under the
Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act for
unsafe and defective streets and highways,
“owned and controlled” by them, and when the
particular municipality at issue has constructive or
actual notice of the condition alleged to constitute
an unsafe and defective street or highway [T.C.A.
§ 29-20-203]. [Also see Swafford v. City of
Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987);
Baker v. Seal, 694 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984);
Bryant v. Jefferson City, 701 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1985); Fretwell v. Chafﬁn, 652 S.W.2d 948
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Johnson v. EMPE, Inc.,
837 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).]
The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act
does not deﬁne the dimensions of a “street” or
“highway,” except to say that it includes “trafﬁc
control devices thereon.” However, a “street” and
a “highway” within the meaning of Tennessee Code

Annotated, Title 55, Chapter 8, which contains the
state law for the rules of the road, are the same:
“the entire width between the boundaries lines of
every way when any part thereto is open to the
use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel”
[T.C.A. §§ 55-8-101(21) and (60)]. Assuming that
the deﬁnition of streets and highways is probably
the same for the purposes of the Tennessee
Governmental Tort Liability Act as it is for T.C.A.,
Title 55, Chapter 8, these deﬁnitions appear to
include the entire street right-of-way.
Apparently there is no reported case under the
Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act involving
damage to a motorist or pedestrian arising from
a condition on private property entirely outside
the boundary of the street right-of-way. But
governments have been held liable for damages
arising from such conditions in a signiﬁcant number
of cases in the United States [3 A.L.R.2d 6;
98 A.L.R.3d 101; 45 A.L.R.3d 875; 3 A.L.R.4th 770;
60 A.L.R.4th 1249; 95 A.L.R.3d 778; 100 A.L.R.3d
510; 54 A.L.R.2d 1195; 52 A.L.R.2d 689;
57 A.L.R.4th 1217; 19 A.L.R.4th 532]. The same
is true with respect to pedestrians in Tennessee
in cases that pre-date the Tennessee Governmental
Tort Liability Act, but that probably still apply
to the application of that Act to streets as well
as sidewalks.
For example, in City of Knoxville v. Baker, 150
S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. 1941), the question was whether
the city was liable for injury to a pedestrian who
voluntarily stepped off a sidewalk and tripped
over a steel water cut-off rod projecting 18 inches
above ground, but located 18 to 21 inches off the
sidewalk and entirely upon private property. The
Tennessee Supreme Court held the city not liable
for the injury on the ground that when he was
injured, the pedestrian was a voluntary trespasser
on private property. But in doing so the Court
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rejected the city’s argument that it was not liable
because “its duty of keeping the street and sidewalk
clear of obstructions extended only to the limits of
the streets ‘as made and used;’ that it was under
no duty to go upon private premises and remove
the water cutoff or erect a barrier along the side
of the walk to prevent persons from straying off
the sidewalk and into a place of danger.” The rule,
declared the Court, is
that if an obstruction or excavation be
permitted which renders the alley, street, or
highway unsafe or dangerous to persons or
vehicles—whether it lie immediately in or
on the alley, street, or highway, or so near
it as to produce the danger to the passer at
any time when he shall properly desire to
use such highway,—it is such a nuisance as
renders the corporation liable…[Emphasis is
mine.]…A party bound to keep a highway in
repair and open for the passage of the public
in a city by night or by day, certainly cannot
be held to perform that duty by simply
keeping the area of the highway free, while
along its edge there is a well or excavation
undisclosed, into which the passer, by an
inadvertent step or an accidental stumble,
might fall at any time. [Citing Niblett v.
Nashville, 59 Tenn. 684, 12 Heisk. 684,
686-689, 27 Am. Rep. 755.] [At 226-227.]
[Emphasis is the courts.]
The Court pointed to 25 Am.Jur., p.184,
Section 531, for support:
As a general rule, the duty of a municipal
or quasi-municipal corporation or of
a private individual to guard excavations or
other dangerous places or hazards and the
resulting liability for failure to do so exists
only when such places are substantially
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adjoining the way, or in such close proximity
thereto as to be dangerous, under ordinary
circumstances, to travelers thereon who,
using ordinary care, or, as it is sometimes
stated, where they are so located that
a person walking on the highway might,
by making a false step or movement, or be
affected with a sudden giddiness, or by other
accident, come into contact therewith. No
deﬁnite rule can be laid down as to how far
a dangerous place must be from the highway
in order to cease to be in close proximity to
it, but the question is a practical one, to be
determined with regard to the circumstances
of the particular case. In the determination
of the question whether a defect or hazard
is in such close proximity to the highway
as to render traveling upon it unsafe, that
proximity must be considered with reference
to the highway ‘as traveled and used for the
public travel,’ rather than as located, and
the proper test for determining the necessity
for a barrier or liability for injury, is whether
the way would be dangerous to a traveler
so using it rather than the distance from it
of the dangerous object or place. The mere
fact that the space adjoining the highway
is unsafe for travel is not enough to impose
such liability, and none exists, either on the
part of the municipality or of the owner of
the premises, if, in order to reach the danger,
one must become an intruder or voluntary
trespasser on the premises of another. The
fact that the injury occurs on the adjoining
premises does not necessarily preclude
a recovery, however where the traveler is
not a voluntary trespasser. Furthermore, if
the traveler is forced to leave the highway
in order to pass around an obstruction
placed by the landowner, the latter is
liable for injury resulting from a dangerous
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condition on his premises even though the
condition was not in such close proximity to
the highway as to render him liable under
ordinary circumstances [At 226].
[Also see Niblett v. Mayor of Nashville, 59 Tenn.
684 (Tenn. 1874); McHargue v. Newcomer & Co.,
100 S.W. 700 (Tenn. 1906); Chattanooga v. Evatt,
14 Tenn. App. 474 (1932).]
As City of Knoxville v. Baker suggests, where
a motorist suffers damage from an obstruction or an
excavation entirely outside the street right-of-way,
the question of the obstruction’s or excavation’s
distance outside the street right-of-way is
a practical one; there is no hard, fast rule. In that
case the plaintiff was injured on private property
when he voluntarily left a sidewalk of ample width
and in good condition. However, reason dictates
that generally, the nearer the excavation or other
condition to the edge of the right-of-way in
general, and to the traveled portion of the street
in particular, the more likely it is that municipal
liability will be found.
Many of the cases in which a municipality has
been found liable for damages arising from
motorists striking obstructions outside the
boundaries of the street right-of-way involve dead
end streets or sharp curves of which motorists were
not warned as they proceeded along the traveled
portion of the roadway, and other unusual conditions
related to the nature and condition of the traveled
portion of the roadway. [See Chattanooga v. Evatt,
14 Tenn. App. 474 (1932).] Generally, it appears
that to recover damages for striking an obstruction
entirely outside the street right-of-way, the motorist
must show that a defect or unsafe condition in the
traveled portion of the street itself caused him to
strike the obstruction.

V. RIGHT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
TO USE STREETS
GENERALLY
It has been held that both public and private
utilities can use municipal streets to install and
maintain their infrastructure without the permission
of, or payment to, the fee owner of the street.
[See Frazier v. East Tennessee Telephone Co.,
90 S.W.620 (1900); Johnson v. Chattanooga,
191 S.W.2d 175 (1945); Pack v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Company, 319 S.W.2d
90 (1958).] The reason is exempliﬁed in Pack v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph, above, in which
the Court, citing a multitude of cases from both
Tennessee and other states, said
Since 1905 under the holding in Frazier v.
East Tennessee Tel. Co., 115 Tenn. 416,
90 S.W. 620, 3 L.R.A., N.S, 323, Tennessee
has been committed to the view that the
use of public rights-of-way by utilities for
locating their facilities is a proper highway
use subject to their principal purpose as
travel and transportation of persons and
property…[At 792].
UTILITY RELOCATION
Generally, while public utilities have the right to use
municipal streets, that right is always subordinate
to the principal purpose of the streets, which is
obviously travel. For that reason, where street
improvements necessitate it, utilities can be made
to remove their facilities from the public streets.
Tennessee follows the common law rule that in the
absence of a statute providing otherwise, public
utilities must remove their facilities at their own
expense [Pack v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
387 S.W.2d 789 (1965); State v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 319 S.W.2d 90 (1958) (cert. denied
by U.S. Supreme Court, 359 U.S. 1011 (1959));

THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF MUNICIPAL STREETS IN TENNESSEE • MUNICIPAL TECHNICAL ADVISORY SERVICE

13

Bristol Tenn. Housing Authority v. Bristol Gas Corp.,
407 S.W.2d 681 (1966); Metropolitan Development
and Housing Agency v. South Central Bell Telephone
Co., 562 S.W.2d 438 (Tenn. App. 1978)].
T.C.A. §§ 54-5-804 et seq. provides for the state’s
payment of the costs of utility relocation with
respect to “public highways.” The deﬁnition of
“public highway” within the meaning of that
statute is a state highway forming part of the
state highway or interstate system, and includes
municipal streets that are part of those systems
[T.C.A. § 54-5-802(5)]. Eligibility for utility
relocation reimbursement under T.C.A. § 54-5-804
hinges on the utility’s compliance with
certain provisions of that statute and of
T.C.A. § 54-5-854(b), the latter of which generally
relates to the timely removal of the utility’s
infrastructure. In addition, reimbursement is
conditioned upon the costs of that statute being
funded and appropriated by the General Assembly
[Public Acts 2003, Chapter 86, §§ 3 and 4].
T.C.A. § 54-22-101, also creates a presumptive
right-of-way width under certain conditions
“[w]herever the state proposes to improve a section
of an existing two (2) lane undivided public road.
[Emphasis is mine.] In addition, that statute
provides that the state is responsible for the
relocation of both above ground and underground
utilities located entirely within that presumptive
right of way. However, T.C.A. § 1-3-105 deﬁnes the
terms used in the T.C.A. The word “Road” “includes
public bridges and may be held equivalent to the
words ‘county way,’ ‘county road,’ or ‘state road’
[Subsection (27)]. For that reason, that statute
probably does not apply to municipal streets.
Nothing in the context of T.C.A. § 54-22-101
indicates that “public road” includes a municipal
street. Indeed, an unsuccessful attempt was made
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several years ago to amend that statute to add
municipal streets to its coverage.

VI. FRANCHISES TO USE STREETS
FRANCHISE NECESSARY?
A franchise has been deﬁned as the “grant of
a right or privilege by the sovereign power usually
with respect to streets or highways primarily to
enable the grantee to perform a public service or
beneﬁt…,” and that, “It is everywhere agreed that
the right to lay pipes in the public highways is itself
a franchise” [Johnson City v. Milligan Utility District,
276 S.W.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1954); Nashville Water Co. v.
Dunlap, 138 S.W.2d 424 (1940)]. It has also been
expressly and impliedly held that a public utility
must obtain a franchise to use a city’s rights of way
[Knoxville v. Park City, 130 Tenn. 626 (1914); Lewis v.
Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 40 S.W.2d 409 (Tenn.
1931); Franklin Light & Power Company v. Southern
Cities Power Company; 47 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1932);
Holston River Electric Co. v. Hydro Electric Corp.,
64 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1933); City of Chattanooga v.
Tennessee Electric Power Co., 112 S.W.2d 385
(Tenn. 1938); Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. City of
Nashville, 152 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1941); Patterson v.
City of Chattanooga, 241 S.W.2d 291 (Tenn. 1951);
Briley v. Cumberland Water Company, 389 S.W.2d
278 (Tenn. 1965)].
STATE OR MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE?
The power to issue franchises in city streets resides
in the state. The state can either grant franchises
directly to public utilities, or it can delegate to its
municipalities its power to grant franchises to
public utilities [Lewis v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co.,
40 S.W.2d 409 (1931); City of Chattanooga v.
Tennessee Electric Power Co., 112 S.W.2d 385 (1938);
City of Memphis v. Postal Tel. Cable Co.,
145 F. 602 (6th Cir. 1906)].
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It is often difﬁcult to determine whether a public
utility’s franchise has been granted by the state
or by the municipality. It has been unsuccessfully
argued by a privately owned utility that its state
charter operated as a state-granted franchise [City
of Chattanooga v. Tennessee Electric Power Company,
112 S.W.2d 385 (1938)].
Telephone and telegraph companies have extremely
broad statutory rights to use public rights-of-way
to install their lines and infrastructure under
T.C.A. § 65-21-101. In addition, T.C.A. § 65-21-102
provides that
Any person or corporation organized for
the purpose of transmitting intelligence by
magnetic telegraph or telephone, or other
system of transmitting intelligence the
equivalent thereof, which may be invented
or discovered, may construct, operate and
maintain telegraph, telephone, or other lines
necessary for the speedy transmission of
intelligence, along and over public highways
and streets of cities and towns…
Those statutes appear to constitute a state-granted
franchise for such companies to use municipal
streets for the installation of their communications
equipment. But City of Memphis v. Postal Telegraph
Cable Co., 145 F. 602 (6th Cir. 1906), appears to
hold otherwise. There the Court rejected Postal’s
argument that various acts under which the city
was vested with the “entire control” of its streets
was superseded by Public Acts 1885, Chapter 66,
Section 1 of which is presently codiﬁed as
T.C.A. §§ 65-21-201–202. Although that act has
been amended several times, it is substantially
the same with respect to the broad powers it
grants to telegraph and telephone companies to
use municipal rights-of-way.

But in Lewis v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co.,
40 S.W. 409 (1941), the Court speaks at length
on “conditional” franchises granted by the state.
The question there was whether the city could
charge the gas company a 5 percent franchise fee.
Yes, answered the Court, under the city’s proprietary
powers. That was true because even though the
gas company had a state-granted franchise, that
franchise was conditioned upon the consent of
the city, and the city’s consent was subject to
contractual bargaining between the city and the
gas company.
The city was authorized by statute to
prescribe the terms and conditions upon
which the gas company might enter and
establish its business. That, it appears, was
done through negotiations with the gas
company, and the obligation, voluntarily
assumed by it, was not the result of the
exercise of a governmental power, but of
contract which both parties could make
[Citation omitted], and the annual payments
prescribed by Section 14 of the ordinance
were compensation to be paid the city for
the exercise of the franchise, conditionally
granted by the state, subject to assent of the
city as the proprietor of its streets…
[At 412-413] [Citations omitted].
Franklin Light & Power Company v. Southern Cities
Power Company, 47 S.W.2d 86 (1932), suggests
that where a municipality has in its charter the
authority to grant franchises in its streets to various
public utilities, a utility desiring to provide its
services inside the municipality must obtain the
municipality’s consent unless the utility can point
to express statutory authority exempting it from
obtaining such consent. There the City of Franklin
had in its charter the power
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…to grant the right of way over streets,
alleys, avenues, squares, and other public
places of said town, for the purposes
of street railroads or other railroads,
telephones, telegraphs, gas pipes, electric
lights, and such other purposes as the board
may deem property; provided that they shall
not grant the exclusive right…to any person,
company, or corporation for more than
twenty years’ and that no general law will
be construed by implication to repeal this
special enactment [At 87].

therein. However, the City of Chattanooga’s charter
provided that the city had the authority to

The Utilities Act of 1919 (presently codiﬁed at
T.C.A. §§ 65-4-101 et seq.) gave the Public Service
Commission [now the Tennessee Regulatory
Authority] “general supervision and regulation of,
jurisdiction and control over all public utilities, and
also over their property, property rights, facilities
and franchises, so far as may be necessary for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act.”
But the Court rejected the utility’s argument that
the Utilities Act of 1919 extinguished the city’s
right to require a utility to obtain a franchise to use
its streets. It reasoned that the statute giving the
Public Service Commission power over utilities and
utility franchises “…nowhere included or conferred
the power to grant to a public utility the privilege
of entering upon the territory of a municipality and
there conducting its business without the consent of
the municipality” [At 91].1

Those charter provisions, held the Court, compelled
the electric company to obtain from the City of
Chattanooga a franchise before it could use the
city’s streets for its utility services. Indeed, it was
said in that case that the city’s power to grant
franchises in its streets need not even be express:

Furthermore, in City of Chattanooga v. Tennessee
Electric Power Co., 112 S.W.2d 385 (1938), the state
granted a charter to an electric company to provide
electric service in Hamilton County or any village

open, alter, widen, extend, establish grade or
otherwise improve, clean, and keep in repair
streets, alleys and sidewalks and to have
the same done “and” to pass all ordinances
not contrary to the constitution and laws
of the state that may be necessary to carry
out the full intent and meaning of this Act
and to accomplish the purpose of their
incorporation [At 388].

While the charter did not in express terms
delegate to the city general control over its
streets and alleys, the powers in reference
thereto were so numerous and sweeping as
to be the equivalent of general control. This
seems to be conceded by counsel for the city,
for they say in their brief: “The charter of the
City of Chattanooga, enacted in 1869, gave
the city general control and supervision of
its streets.
In the case of American Car and Foundry
Co. v. Johnson County, 147 Ky. 69, 71,
143 S.W. 773, 774, quoted with approval by
the Supreme Court of the United States in
Owensboro v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co.,
230 U.S. 58, 67, 33 S. Ct. 988, 991,

____________________

The deﬁnition of a “public utility” for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated, title 65, chapter 4, expressly excludes “any
county, municipal corporation or other subdivision of the state of Tennessee.” It also excludes a number of other governmentally
owned utilities, [T.C.A. § 65-5-101 (a)(2)].
1
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57 L.Ed. 1389, 1394, it appears that the
county ﬁscal courts were given, by statute,
“general charge and supervision of the public
roads,” etc. Ky. St. Section 4306. Concerning
the power resulting from the grant by the
state to control streets or public highways,
the court said
“The right to grant a franchise presupposes
and is based upon the right of the authority
granting the franchise to control the property
over which is affected by it. For example,
the ﬁscal court could grant a franchise
authorizing the erection of poles along
the highways of the county, as the ﬁscal
court has control of the highways. And so
municipal corporations may grant franchises
to use the streets and public ways of a city.”
In Humes v. Mayor of Knoxville, 20 Tenn. 403,
1 Humph. 403, 34 Am.Dec. 657, it was held
that a municipal corporation is the proprietor
of the public streets, which are held in trust
for the convenience of the citizens, and as
such proprietor may grade and otherwise
improve them. Under its charter, the City
of Chattanooga had the general control and
supervision of its streets, in trust, for the
convenience of its citizens [At 388-89].
COUNTIES AND UTILITY DISTRICTS PROVIDING
UTILITY SERVICE IN MUNICIPALITIES
T.C.A. § 5-1-118 gives counties authority to
establish and operate utility systems, including
sewer systems, through the device of permitting
them by resolution to exercise certain powers given
to municipalities under the general law mayoraldermanic charter, including those contained in
T.C.A. § 6-2-201(3) B(8), (10)B(13), (18), (19),
(26), and (29). But there is no suggestion in that

statute that counties can establish sewer systems
inside municipalities.
Counties are also authorized under
T.C.A. §§ 5-16-101 et seq. to establish and
operate “urban type public facilities,” including
sewer systems. That authority extends to
“any area or areas within their border”
[T.C.A. § 5-16-101(a)]. Notwithstanding that
language, it does not appear that the county
has authority to extend sewer service within the
corporate limits of a municipality without its
permission. Upon the annexation or incorporation of
territory, the annexing or incorporating municipality
has the exclusive authority to provide the urban
type public facilities in question and to take over
such facilities. In addition, the county cannot
extend any urban services type facilities within
ﬁve miles of an existing municipality
…unless such incorporated city or town has
failed to take appropriate action to provide
a speciﬁed public service facility or facilities
in a speciﬁed area or areas for a period of
ninety (90) days after having been
petitioned to do so by resolution of the
county legislative body or other governing
body… (T.C.A. § 5-16-111).
That statute appears to permit the county to
provide the urban type public facility within ﬁve
miles of the municipality and to its very doorstep
upon the appropriate petition, but probably cannot
be read broadly enough to permit the provision of
such a facility within the corporate limits of the
municipality without its consent.
T.C.A. § 7-51-401 provides that
“(a) Except as provided in § 7-82-302 [the
Utility District Act] each county, utility
district, municipality, or other public agency
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conducting any utility service speciﬁcally
including waterworks, water plants and
water distribution systems, and sewage
collection and treatment systems is
authorized to extend such services beyond
the boundaries of such county, utility
district, municipality, or public agency to
customers desiring such service.”
but that
(c) No such county, utility district,
municipality, or public utility agency shall
extend its services into sections of roads
or streets already occupied by other public
agencies rendering the same service, so long
as other public agency continues to render
such service.
That statute authorizes the named political
subdivisions, including counties, to extend their
utility systems outside their boundaries. It can
be argued that it implies that those political
subdivisions have the authority to make such
extensions into other political subdivisions, provided
that the streets proposed for use contain no other
utility lines belonging to another utility and already
providing the utility service in question. But
Knoxville v. Park City, 130 Tenn. 626 (1914), and
Franklin Light & Power Company v. Southern Cities
Power Company, 47 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1932), require
that a utility’s authority to extend its service into
a municipality without that municipality’s consent
be express authority. It is not enough that the
statute authorizes the utility to extend its system
outside its boundaries.
T.C.A. §§ 7-34-101 et seq. authorizes municipalities,
including both counties and cities, to construct
various “public works,” including sewer systems
[T.C.A. § 7-34-102], but also declares that,
“[n]o municipality shall construct public works
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wholly or partly within the corporate limits of
another municipality except with the consent of
the governing body of such other municipality”
[T.C.A. § 7-34-105].
Municipalities, including counties and cities, are
also authorized to establish and operate electric
systems under T.C.A. § 7-52-101 et seq. and to
transfer to the utility board any sewage works that
it “now or hereafter” owns and operates. But that
statute provides that the municipality has the power
to “[a]cquire, improve, operate and maintain within
and/or without the corporate or county limits of
such municipality, and within the corporate limits
of any other municipality, with the consent of such
other municipality, an electric plant…”
T.C.A. § 5-1-113 appears to give counties broad
general authority to enter into “contractual
relations” with municipalities lying within their
boundaries, to “conduct, operate or maintain, either
jointly or otherwise, desirable and necessary services
or functions.” They also have the power to “contract
and be contracted with” under T.C.A. § 5-1-118(1).
T.C.A. §§ 5-16-101 et seq. authorize counties to
establish and operate urban type public facilities,
including sewer systems. Section 5-16-109(a)
gives the board, with the approval of the county
legislative body, broad authority to enter into
contracts with municipalities and other governments
“for the furnishing of services and facilities within
the purview of this chapter…”
Among the utility laws that give both cities and
counties the authority to establish and operate
sewer systems outside their territorial limits,
T.C.A. §§ 7-34-101 et seq. obliquely permit both
entities to provide sewer service in the other, by
consent [T.C.A. § 7-34-105]. It is not clear whether
the same is true under T.C.A. §§ 7-52-101 et seq.
That statute speciﬁcally applies to electric systems,
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but cities and counties may also transfer to the
utility board various utilities, including sewer
systems [T.C.A. § 7-52-111]. One of the powers of
such utility boards is the power to extend electric
service across city and county lines, with the
consent of the city or county in question. That
power may not apply to a sewer system operated by
the utility board.
FRANCHISE FEES; POLICE POWER FEES
Paris v. Paris-Henry County Utility District,
340 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1960), supports the proposition that municipalities can charge a franchise fee
for the use of their streets by public utilities, as well
as certain police power fees, the former of which
are imposed under a municipality’s proprietary, the
latter under a municipality’s governmental, powers.
[For a detailed outline of this case see IV. SELECTED
LEGAL POTHOLES AND PATCHES INVOLVING
MUNICIPAL STREETS: MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER
OVER STREETS in this publication.] An ordinance in
that case gave the utility district a franchise to use
the city’s streets for the installation of its gas pipes,
but did not provide for a franchise fee. The Court
said that, the “fees, charges, or licenses,” referred
to in that franchise, “were a matter of contract,
or rather were forbidden by the contract, between
Defendant and the City acting in its proprietary
capacity” [At 889] [Emphasis is mine]. The Court
cited for support Lewis v. Nashville Gas & Heating
Co., 40 S.W.2d 409 (Tenn. 1931).
In Lewis v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co., Section 14
of the franchise agreement provided for the payment
of 5 percent of Nashville Gas & Heating’s revenues
to the City of Nashville. After concluding that the
city had authority in its charter to control its streets
and regulate the granting of franchises, and that
the statutes giving the Public Service Commission
the power to regulate utilities did not supersede the
city’s right to require the utility to obtain

a franchise to use its streets, the Court discussed
at length the nature and implications of franchises.
Under the statutes referred to, the gas
company’s franchise was dependent upon
approval and consent of the municipal
government and upon such terms and
conditions as it might impose. The power
to assent and impose conditions thus
recognized by the Legislature carried
with it the correlative right of the city
to make terms and impose conditions
[Citations omitted].
The annual payments which the gas company
agreed to make to induce the city to let it in and
to use then existing and subsequently extended
streets were not exacted through the exercise of
governmental power. The provision of Section 14
of the ordinance requiring these payments was the
result of negotiations, culminating in a contract
between the city acting in its corporate and
proprietary capacity and the gas company exercising
its power to contract.
One of the conditions which a municipal
corporation can lawfully attach to the grant
of a franchise is the payment of money; and
the payment need not be such as imposed
upon all others similarly situated, as in the
case of a tax, or the equivalent of the cost
of inspection and replacement, as in the case
of a license fee imposed under the police
power, but may be a deﬁnite sum arbitrarily
selected, and if the company does not wish
to pay it need not accept the franchise…
The gas company having voluntarily
obligated itself, as provided in Section 14
of Ordinance 155, the continued exaction
of the payment thereunder violates no right
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guaranteed by the State or the Federal
Constitution [At 412-13].
[Also see Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. City
of Nashville, 152 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1941).]
The franchise fee-police power fee distinction
appears again in the unreported case of City
of Chattanooga v. BellSouth Telecommunications,
2000 WL 122199 (Tenn. Ct. App.). There the City
of Chattanooga adopted an ordinance imposing
a franchise fee of 5 percent of the gross revenues
of telecommunications companies using the city’s
streets. The Court, pointing to Paris v. Paris-Henry
County Utility District, 340 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1960),
and other cases, declared that any fee charged by
the city must rely upon the city’s governmental
(police power), rather than its proprietary, powers.
The Court did not mention T.C.A. § 65-21-103,
which authorizes municipalities to charge telegraph
and telephone companies police power “rent,” but
declared that because two of the parties to the
case already had a franchise (which apparently
did not provide for a franchise fee) which were
not subject to alteration, and because the city
could not discriminate against the providers of
telecommunications service, the city could not
impose franchise fees upon any of the parties. The
5 percent franchise fee could not survive as a police
power rent because it bore no relationship to the
city’s cost of regulating the telecommunications
provider’s use of the streets.
CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISES
The Cable Television Act of 1977, found at
T.C.A. § 7-59-101, expressly declares that
The governing body of each municipality
in each county in this state has the power
and authority to regulate the operation of
any cable television company which serves
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customers within its territorial limits, by
the issuance of franchise licenses after
public notice and showing the terms of
any proposed franchise agreement and
public initiation for fees and not inconsistent
with any rules and regulations of the
federal communications commission
[Emphasis is mine].
Cable television providers must also obtain
a franchise to use municipal streets to provide such
services [T.C.A. §§ 7-59-101 et seq.; James Cable
Partners, L.P. v. City of Jamestown, 818 S.W.2d 338
(Tenn. App. 1991)].
The Cable Television Act of 1977 provides that,
“A county shall not issue a franchise within any
municipality” [T.C.A. § 7-59-101(c)]. In addition,
1999 amendments to that Act provide that even
electrical systems operating under the Municipal
Electrical Plant Law of 1935, and that provide cable
television services, must obtain a franchise “from
the appropriate municipal governing body or county
governing body” [T.C.A.§ 7-59-102], and that
Nothing contained in this section shall be
interpreted to limit the authority of the
franchising authority to collect franchise
fees, control and regulate its streets and
public ways, or enforce its powers to provide
for the public health, safety and welfare
[T.C.A. § 7-59-102(k)].
That Act and its 1999 amendments undoubtedly
speak of the “municipality” of the “county,” and
of the “franchising authority,” respectively, as
an incorporated municipality within a county, as
the territory in the county excluding incorporated
municipalities, and as the municipality when
the cable television service is provided within
a municipality, and as the county when the cable
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television service is provided within a county
outside an incorporated municipality.
LIMITING CHARACTER OF FRANCHISES
Changing terms of a franchise. Rights vest in
the franchise holder during the life of the
franchise. Generally, those rights cannot be
impaired or revoked by the municipality
[City of Paris v. Paris-Henry County Public Utility
District, 340 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1960)]. It is
further said in City of Chattanooga v. Tennessee
Electric Power Company, 112 S.W.2d 385
(Tenn. 1938), citing 12 R.C.L. 213, 214, that
The grant of a franchise to a public utility
company is, according to the weight of
authority, a grant of a property right in
perpetuity, unless limited in duration by the
grant itself, or as a consequence of some
limitation imposed by the general law of
the state, or by the corporate powers of the
municipality making the grant. If there be
authority to make the grant, and it contains
no limitation or qualiﬁcation as to duration,
the plainest principles of justice and right
demand that it shall not be cut down, in
the absence of some controlling principle of
public policy [At 389-90].
Footnote 3 of James Cable Partners, L.P., v. City of
Jamestown, 818 S.W.2d 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992),
declares that
Once an ordinance which grants a franchise
is accepted and “all conditions imposed
instant to the right performed, it ceases
to be a mere license and becomes a valid
contract, and constitutes a vested right.”
12 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 34.06.
This contract once established has the

same status and effect as any other
contract enforceable under the law
[36 Am.Jur.2d Franchises § 6 (1968)].
The contractual nature of franchises severely limits
the right of municipalities to charge franchise fees
where there is no record in the initial or subsequent
line of franchises that provide for such fees.
REGULATION OF FRANCHISES BY THE TENNESSEE
REGULATORY AUTHORITY (TRA)
T.C.A. Title 65, particularly chapters 4 and 5, give
the TRA extensive authority to regulate privately
owed public utilities, and limited authority to
regulate municipally owned public utilities.
Tennessee municipal utilities are expressly excluded
from the deﬁnition of “public utilities” for those
purposes in T.C.A. § 65-4-101(a)(2). But the TRA’s
regulation of municipal utilities comes through its
right to regulate the relationship between public
utilities and municipalities.
Franchise payments by a public utility for the use of
municipal streets made after February 24, 1961, are,
insofar as practicable, to be billed pro rata to the
public utility’s customers [T.C.A. § 65-4-105(e)].
Franchises granted to any public utility by the state
or any political subdivision must have the approval
of the TRA, which must hold a hearing to determine
whether the franchise is necessary for the public
convenience [T.C.A. § 65-4-107]. T.C.A. § 65-4-201
prohibits a public utility from extending services
to a municipality already being served by another
utility unless it obtains a certiﬁcate of convenience.
A public utility can appeal to the TRA any order or
regulation made by a municipality, and the TRA can
resolve such an appeal [T.C.A. § 65-4-109].
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VII. DETERMINING THE WIDTH
OF MUNICIPAL STREETS
WIDTHS BASED ON PLATS, DEEDS, ETC.
Sometimes the width of street easements can easily
be ascertained from a plat, deed, or other allied
documents. That is probably most true of streets
established by formal dedication and acceptance, by
formal dedication and implied acceptance, and by
eminent domain. However, often no such documents
exist with respect to many street easements,
particularly in the cases of implied dedication and
acceptance and of prescription. Such documents as
can be found in other cases do not usually specify
the width of the easement.
The heavy weight of authority in the United States
is that where there is an express grant of a street
easement that does not specify its width, the width
is determined by the intention of the parties to
the grant, and that intention is determined from
the facts and circumstances, sometimes including
the use of the easement. Generally, the width
determined by the courts is what is reasonable,
convenient, and suitable [28 A.L.R.2d 253].
That also appears to be the rule in Tennessee.
With respect to streets created by formal dedication
and acceptance, it was said in Town of Benton
v. Peoples Bank of Polk County, 904 S.W.2d 598
(Tenn. App. 1995), that “the object in all boundary
cases is to ﬁnd, as nearly as may be, certain
evidence of what particular land was meant to be
included for conveyance” [At 601]. It was also said
in Doyle v. Chattanooga, 128 Tenn. 433 (1913), that
The execution of an ofﬁcial map by the city,
showing the street offered to be dedicated to
be such, has also been held to be evidence
of an acceptance. [Citation omitted.] Where
the dedication is clearly deﬁned, as in this
case by a registered map, and the public user
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is of the whole, practically speaking, the
presumption is that an act of acceptance of
a part thereof is an acceptance of the whole
[Citations omitted] [At 441].
WIDTHS BASED ON “USER”
With respect to the width of street easements
acquired by user or prescription, it is said in
39 Am.Jur.2d Highways, Streets and Bridges,
Section 63, that
As a general proposition, the width of
a highway established solely by prescription
or user is determined by the extent of such
use… While there are cases which appear
to recognize that a highway acquired by
prescription or user does not extend beyond
the beaten or traveled path, it is more
generally held that the public easement
is not necessarily conﬁned strictly to the
beaten or traveled path in every instance. In
some cases the determination of the width
of a highway acquired by prescription or
user rests upon whether or not a particular
width is necessary for the convenience of the
public… Ditches along the side of a highway
acquired by prescription or user are generally
regarded within the boundaries of a highway.
It is likewise said in 10A McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, Section 39.29, that
The extent of the prescriptive easement, it
is held, is governed entirely by the extent
of the user. The boundary of a public
highway acquired by public use is
a question of fact to be determined by the
appropriate ﬁnder of fact. This is to say,
that the extent of a street or alley acquired
by prescription is generally limited to the
portion actually used.
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But 10A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
30.22, also says, that
It has been held that the width of
a prescriptive easement is not limited to that
portion of the road actually traveled, and it
may include the shoulders and the ditches
that are needed and have actually been used
to support and maintain the traveled portion.
76 A.L.R.2d 535 says that the width of street
easements established by prescription is determined
by the extent of use. It also appears to conclude
that generally the width of such easements includes
not only the traveled portions of the street, but also
such adjacent land reasonably necessary for public
travel as determined by the peculiar circumstances
of the case in question, and such additional land
as might be needed for repairs and improvements.
It also points to cases holding that the easement
includes drainage ditches and waterways.
Finally, 10A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
Section 30.03 says that, “Street, in a legal sense,
usually includes all parts of the way—the roadway,
the gutters and the sidewalks.”
However, it was said in Blackburn v. Dillon,
225 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. 1946), that “[t]he term street
in ordinary legal signiﬁcation includes all parts of
the way, roadway, gutters and the sidewalks.” In
that case the width of the street easement in that
case was clearly 40 feet, and the only question
was whether the city had the authority to build
a sidewalk within that easement as a form of public
travel, but the proposition that the width of the
“street” includes the roadway, gutters and sidewalks
appears to apply to street width in general.

WIDTHS BASED ON STATUTES
In Ludwick v. Doe, 914 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1996), the Court pointed to the deﬁnitions of
“street” and “highway” in T.C.A. § 55-8-101(60)
and (21). The deﬁnition of both terms is the same:
“the entire width between boundary lines of every
way when any part thereof is open to the use of the
public for purposes of vehicular trafﬁc.” For that
reason, concluded the Court
It is obvious from these deﬁnitions that
the concept of a ‘street’ or ‘highway’
contemplates an area that is wider than
the part used for the “purposes of vehicular
trafﬁc.” It should also be noted that neither
deﬁnition is tied to a paved area. We believe
that when the deﬁnitional language is given
its ‘ordinary and usual meaning’ read in the
context of the deﬁnitions, the conclusion
is inescapable that the legislature intended
that the words ‘street’ and ‘highway’ would
be synonymous with the full right of way.
Thus a ‘street’ or ‘highway’ as those words are
used in Tennessee Code Annotated 55-8-118
[which regulates passing on the right], refers
to the part designated for vehicular travel by
the public, any paved shoulder, any unpaved
shoulder, and any remaining part of the right
of way [Citing State v. Mains, 634 S.W.2d 280,
282 (Tenn. Cr. App.)] [At 525].
In State v. Mains, 634 S.W.2d 280 (Tenn. Cr. App.
1982), the Court considered the question of whether
a defendant charged with vehicular homicide arising
from drunk driving was on the “highway,” when
the homicide occurred off the paved portion of the
roadway. The area in question was described by
witnesses as a
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‘pull-out place’ and was described by one
ofﬁcer as being two hundred to three
hundred feet long and wide enough for two
or three cars to park side by side. This ofﬁcer
also testiﬁed the area was part of the ‘state
highway right of way.’
Pointing to the deﬁnition of “highway” in
T.C.A. § 55-8-101(20) [now (21)], the Court
declared that, “The word ‘highway’ is deﬁned for
the purposes of the drunken driving statute as:
‘The entire width between the boundary lines
of every way publicly maintained when any part
thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes
of vehicular travel.” [Note: the term “publicly
maintained” was removed from the statute by Public
Acts 1988, chapter 555.] Then the Court went on to
determine what that width included.
The term ‘public highway’ has been described
by our Supreme Court as ‘such a passageway
as any and all members of the public have
an absolute right to use as distinguished
from a permissive privilege of using same.’
[Citations omitted.] Other states have held
that the “shoulder” of a highway is included
in the term ‘highway.’ [Citations omitted.]
Interpreting a legislative deﬁnition similar
to ours cited above, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the statutory
reference to the ‘entire width’ includes
everything between the right of way lines
of the ‘highway’ for statutory purposes
[At 282].
Those deﬁnitions included the pull-off, concluded
the Court.
T.C.A. § 54-5-202, declares with respect to the width
of state highways in municipalities that
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The streets so constructed, reconstructed,
improved and maintained by the state
shall be of such width and type as the
department may think proper, but the width
so constructed, reconstructed, improved and
maintained shall not be less than eighteen
feet (18’); and, in the case of resurfacing and
maintenance, from curb to curb where curbs
exist, or the full width of the roadway where
no curbs exist.

VIII. CLOSING MUNICIPAL STREETS
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLOSING AND
ABANDONING STREETS
It is said in 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
§ 30.182, that the distinction between abandonment
of a street, and the closing or vacation of a street is
that the former is accomplished by inaction, and the
latter by a prescribed procedure. Some cases suggest
that a city can abandon a street without the beneﬁt
of an ordinance. It is said in Wilkins v. Chicago
St. L. & N.O.R., Co., 75 S.W. 1026 (1903), that
It is also true that the city has the right to
abandon a street, that is, its easement of
way, which it holds in trust for the public, or
for the public interest; and that upon such
abandonment the fee reverts to the adjoining
proprietors, if they own to the center of the
street…[At 465].
[Also see State v. Taylor, 64 S.W. 766 (1901), and
Knoxville v. Sprankle, 9 Tenn. App. 218 (1928).]
But none of those cases clearly say that
a municipality can “abandon” a street by inaction.
In West Meade Homeowners Association v. WPMC,
778 S.W.2d 365 (1989), WPMC sought to use
as an ingress and egress from its development
a platted street, only a portion of which had been
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constructed, and which ended in a cul-de-sac. The
homeowners association argued that the city had
abandoned that portion of the platted street that
had never been constructed. The court rejected that
argument, pointing to certain evidence that the city
had at least impliedly accepted that portion of the
street. There is no hint in that case of how the
court would have addressed the homeowners
association abandonment argument had there
been no such evidence.
The Tennessee courts appear to use the words
“abandon,” “close,” and “vacation,” interchangeably
with respect to streets. Most municipal charters
prescribe a procedure for the passage of ordinances.
There may be rare instances where a charter
prescribes a special procedure for the passage of
ordinances closing streets.
BROAD MUNICIPAL DISCRETION TO CLOSE STREETS
Generally, property owners have little legal voice
in the closing of city streets, and the courts will
not interfere with municipal decisions in those
areas absent fraud or a clear abuse of discretion
[Georgia v. Chattanooga, 4 Tenn. App. 674 (1927);
Brimer v. Municipality of Jefferson City, 216 S.W.2d 1
(1948); Swafford v. City of Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d
174 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); W. G. Wilkins v. Chicago,
St. Louis & New Orleans Railroad Co., 110 Tenn. 423
(1903); Sweetwater Valley Memorial Park v. City
of Sweetwater, 372 S.W.2d 168 (1963); Cash
& Carry Lumber Company, Inc. v. Olgiati,
385 S.W.2d 115 (1964)].
It is said in Sweetwater Valley Memorial Park v. City
of Sweetwater, 372 S.W.2d 168 (1963), citing other
cases, that
Authorities are abundant for the proposition
that a municipal corporation being the
state’s representative, may ordinarily vacate,

discontinue, or abandon its easement in
a street or part thereof, whenever, by its
proper board, found, to be unnecessary for
public use [Citation omitted].
The rule appears to enjoy universal
acceptance in this court as has been
stated by this Court on numerous occasions
[Citations omitted].
In the absence of an allegation of fraud or
a manifest abuse of discretion, courts will
not inquire into the motives of municipalities
for vacating a public street [At 169].
The Court continued with a citation of 25 Am.Jur.,
Highways, Section 29, page 418:
The question of the necessity for closing
a street or highway, as distinguished
from the question of public purpose or
use, belongs exclusively to the legislative
department of the government. So, the
province of the public authorities in whom
the power to vacate is vested to determine
when it shall be exercised, and their action
in this regard will not be reviewed by the
courts in the absence of fraud or a manifest
abuse of discretion. The court cannot control
or revise such discretion on the ground of
inexpediency, injustice or impropriety…
Ordinarily, the presumption is that a street
or highway was vacated in the interest of
the public and that its vacation was
necessary for public purposes, and the
burden of showing to the contrary will
be upon the persons objecting to the
proceedings [At 169].
The same court built on those principles in
Cash & Carry Lumber Company, Inc. v. Olgiati,
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385 S.W.2d 115 (1964), in which the City of
Chattanooga closed one block of a city street.
The property upon which the street lay reverted to
an abutting stove works, which was apparently using
the street for storage and other purposes. Relying
on Sweetwater, above, the Court upheld the
chancellor’s denial of Cash & Carry’s petition for
an injunction prohibiting the city from closing the
street. Cash & Carry had not alleged facts sufﬁcient
to make out a case of fraud. “None of the ofﬁcials
here involved have been charged in the bill with
acts showing falsity, concealment, deceit, or
perversion of the truth” [At 117-18]. Nor did the
facts show a manifest abuse of discretion. The fact
that the property would revert to, and beneﬁt, the
abutting property owner, did not in and of itself
show an abuse of discretion or fraud.
Turning to the issue of inconvenience suffered by
Cash & Carry in the closing of the street, the Court
declared that
To reach complainant’s property, it is
apparent that some convenience will be
sacriﬁced. No longer will complainant have
a direct access for a distance of two blocks
to Main Street. Instead, travelers will be
forced to go over one block east or west
and then down, increasing the distance to
Main Street at most one block. However,
there is no allegation that reasonable
egress and ingress will be destroyed
[At 118] [Emphasis is mine].
STREETS SHOULD BE CLOSED BY ORDINANCE
In Wilkey v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Paciﬁc
Railway Company, 340 S.W.2d 256 (1960), the Rhea
County Chancery Court permanently enjoined the
railroad and the city from closing a railway crossing
on a certain street, which was barricaded on both
ends of the crossing. However, it is clear that the
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case would have gone the other way had the city
closed the crossing by ordinance. The city had
passed a resolution to close the crossing upon the
completion by the state of an underpass several
blocks away. After the underpass was completed,
the contractor barricaded the crossing in accordance
with its contract with the state for the construction
of the underpass. The city’s resolution and the
contractor’s barricade was not good enough,
declared the Court.
…We cannot agree that the resolution in
question obviates the need of an ordinance
closing the crossing on West Second
Avenue… It may well be, as both the State
and the Railway company strongly insist,
that it is necessary to close the crossing on
West Second Avenue to promote the safety of
the traveling public. If so, the responsibility
for closing it remains with the local
authorities [At 259].
In Cash & Carry Lumber Company, the Court
distinguished Wilkey, explaining why the injunction
against the closing of the railroad crossing in that
case was an aberration.
Wilkey [citation omitted], cited by appellants
for the proposition that no remedy at
law exists is readily distinguishable and
is not controlling. In the Wilkey case, the
municipal government had failed to close
the grade crossing by ordinance, and the
Court of Appeals held that there had been
no exercise of eminent domain, and that no
damages would be recoverable; therefore, an
injunction was the proper remedy.
In the instant case, the proper municipal
authority has by ordinance abandoned the
street in question. If complainant’s property
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has been thereby taken, the remedy is at law
with an action for compensation [At 118]
[Citing Sweetwater] [Emphasis is mine].
PLANNING COMMISSION APPROVAL REQUIRED
TO CLOSE STREET
T.C.A. § 13-4-104 provides that after the planning
commission has adopted all or a part of the plan
for the city,
…the widening, narrowing, relocation,
vacation, change in the use, acceptance,
acquisition, sale or lease of any street
or public way, ground, place, property
or structure shall be subject to similar
submission and approval [to the planning
commission], and the failure to approve
may be similarly overruled [by the municipal
governing body].
OTHER PREREQUISITES FOR CLOSING STREETS
Unless a statute or charter provides otherwise,
no notice need be given property owners of
a municipality’s intention to close a street
[Sweetwater Valley Memorial Park, Inc. v.
Sweetwater, 372 S.W.2d 168 (1963)]. There is no
state law prescribing any special notice or other
special procedures precedent to the closing of
municipal streets. T.C.A. § 54-10-201 contains
notice and other procedures for the closing of
county roads. Apparently at least one trial court has
held that those procedures apply to the closing of
municipal streets. Such a holding is clearly wrong.
However, because of the potential problems street
closings can have, municipalities are advised to give
reasonable and well-publicized notice to abutting
property owners and other interested citizens
of their intent to close a street. A municipality
considering closing a street should also determine
whether its charter contains provisions governing
the closing of streets.

IX. SELECTED LEGAL POTHOLES AND
PATCHES INVOLVING CLOSED STREETS
OWNERSHIP OF CLOSED STREETS
Unless a city owns a fee simple in the land upon
which the street sits, it has no further legal
interest in the street following its abandonment.
In State v. Taylor, 64 S.W. 766 (1901), the City
of Union City by ordinance and deed conveyed
one of its streets to a business. In declaring the
conveyance ultra vires and void, the Court
declared that
It is obvious under our law, that the
ordinance and deed in question were
ineffective to pass any portion of Washington
Avenue to the intended vendees; ﬁrst,
because the corporation did not own the
fee in the street, and secondly, because the
easement which it did own was not subject
to sale and conveyance. The corporation
had only the right to use this street for
street purposes. That was the extent of the
dedication and the board had no authority
to exceed its limits. The platting of territory
and sale of the lots by the original owner
in the manner hereto recited vested the
city as such, but not otherwise in the
municipality, and at the same time passed
to the respective lot purchasers the ultimate
fee to the soil to the center of the streets
on which they severally abutted [Citations
omitted]… So, the corporation had only an
easement in Washington Avenue, and that,
from its nature, was incapable of alienation
and passage to an individual. Hence, to
repeat what has already been remarked,
the ordinance and deed relied on by the
defendant were inoperative as to the fee
because the corporation did not own it,
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and as to the easement because it was not
transferable [At 768].
Even though the conveyance was ultra vires
and void, its effect “was, nevertheless, in legal
contemplation, and, in fact, an abandonment of
its easement in so much of Washington Avenue,
and though through that abandonment the strip of
ground in question ceased to be a part of the public
street, and by operation of law reverted to the owner
of the ultimate fee” [At 268].
It has been repeatedly said that, municipalities
usually do not own the fee in land dedicated
for streets [Hamilton County v. Rape, 47 S.W. 416
(1898); Georgia v. Chattanooga, 4 Tenn. App.
674 (1913); State v. Taylor, 74 S.W. 766 (1903)].
Generally, they have only easements in their streets,
and abutting property owners are presumed to own
the fee to the center line of the street [Hamilton
County v. Rape, 47 S.W. 416 (1898); Patton v.
Chattanooga, 65 S.W. 414 (1901)]. It is also said in
Rogers v. City of Knoxville, 289 S.W.23d 868 (Tenn.
1955), that “[t]he generally accepted rule is that
where a right of way is condemned [Emphasis is the
Court’s] it reverts upon nonuser to the owner of
the fee…” [At 873]. Smokey Mountain Railroad Co.,
above, did not distinguish between rights-of-way
taken by eminent domain from other rights-of-way,
citing Rogers for the proposition that “[w]here
a right of way is abandoned, it generally reverts
upon non-user to the owner of the fee” [At 913].
[Also see State v. Taylor, 74 S.W. 766 (1903),
and Wilkins v. Chicago, St. L. & N.O.R., Co.,
75 S.W. 1026 (1903).]
EFFECT OF STREET CLOSURE ON ABUTTING
PROPERTY OWNERS
The closure or abandonment of a street does not
affect any private rights abutting landowners
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might have with respect to access to the easement
[Cartwright v. Bell, 418 S.W.2d 463 (1967); Stokely v.
Southern Railway, 418 S.W.2d 255 (1967); Knierim v.
Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806 (1976); Jacoway v.
Palmer, 753 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. App. 1987)].
However, it has been held that while a municipality
has the near unfettered right to close a municipal
street, the closing may be a compensable taking of
property [Sweetwater Valley Memorial Park v. City of
Sweetwater, 372 S.W.2d 168 (1963); Cash & Carry
Lumber Company v. Olgiati, 385 S.W.2d 115 (1964)].
But minor inconvenience accruing to abutting
property owners upon the closing of a street does
not necessarily amount to a compensable taking.
Under Cash & Carry Lumber Company, there had to
be an allegation that “reasonable egress and ingress
would be destroyed.” In Sweetwater, it is said that
It is well settled in this State and elsewhere
that the destruction or serious impairment of
a landowner’s right of ingress or egress is
a taking of property for which compensation
must be paid. [Citations omitted] Thus,
if the closing of the northeast end of
Anderson Street destroys or seriously impairs
complainant’s right of ingress and egress, it
may bring an action to recover compensation
for this taking. See § 23-1423, T.C.A., and
authorities cited thereunder. Such an action
normally is known as inverse condemnation.
[Citation omitted] But the complainant
cannot enjoin the closing of a street
[At 170] [Emphasis is mine].
Although the question of the inconvenience of the
access in Cash & Carry Lumber Company related to
the city’s discretion in the closing of the street,
that case suggests that inconvenient access must
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rise to the level of unreasonableness before it
constitutes a taking.
UTILITIES OCCUPYING CLOSED STREETS
As far as can be determined, there is no statutory or
case law in Tennessee, and little case law in other
states, directly on the question whether a utility has
the right to continue to occupy a street that has
been vacated or closed. However, Beadle v. Town of
Crossville, 7 S.W.2d 992 (1928), hints at the answer
to the question in Tennessee. There the city closed
First Street for the construction of a standpipe or
reservoir for its waterworks.
Beadle argued that when the city closed First Street,
the land automatically reverted to the abutting
property owners, of which he was one, and that
the city had no right to build such a facility on his
property. The city had a right to close First Street,
and the right to condemn the property to build
a standpipe for its waterworks on that location,
concluded the Court. The only remedy Beadle had,
continued the Court, was a suit to recover damages
for the taking of his land.
It is difﬁcult to see why the remedy of a property
owner as to a utility facility already in the ground
when a street is closed would be any different
than the remedy of a property owner as to a utility
facility a city intends to place in the ground after
the street is closed. In both cases the property
having automatically reverted to the abutting or
other actual owners, those owners would be entitled
to payment for the taking of the land for utility
purposes, in the latter situation for an inverse
taking. It was also said in Cash & Carry Lumber Co. v.
Olgiati, 385 S.W.2d 115 (1964), that
In the instant case, the proper municipality
has by ordinance abandoned the street in
question. If complainant’s property has

thereby been taken, the remedy is at law
in an action for compensation [Sweetwater
Valley Mem. Park v. Sweetwater, supra,
372 S.W.2d at 170] [At 118].
That language appears to cover a situation where
a city closes or vacates a street and leaves any
utility infrastructure in the ground.
The law in other jurisdictions supports the theory
that when a city closes or vacates a street, it
cannot attach a condition that entitles the utility
infrastructure to remain in the ground unless the
city condemns a utility easement. The case of re
City of Altoona, 388 A.2d 313 (Pa. 1978), held that
when the city passes an ordinance vacating a street,
a utility easement in the ordinance was void. The
Court reasoned that
When the public right to use Kenyon Road
was validly terminated by the City of
Altoona, the property reverted automatically
and simultaneously to the abutting owners.
[Citations omitted] The abutting owners are
entitled to their full reversionary interest
which the City may not dilute by imposing
upon the dedication a burden not bargained
for or contemplated; the dedication of
Kenyon Road was for the purpose of affording
the public a right of passage not to beneﬁt
utility companies or their customers.
Although an easement for utilities in and
along Kenyon Road may not have been
incompatible with its use as a roadway and
would not have interfered with the rights of
the owners of the underlying fee, as long as
the roadway was in use, [citation omitted],
there is no reason to suppose that the
easement for utilities would be consistent
with the purposes for which the land could
now be used by the abutting owners after
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the cessation of the dedicated use… In
sum, we hold that when Altoona terminated
the use for which the land was dedicated, it
could not at the same time reserve the right
to an ancillary use not stipulated for in
the original dedication [Citations omitted]
[At 316-17].
In accord are Gable v. City of Cedar Rapids,
129 N.W. 737 (Iowa 1911), People ex rel. Greer v.
City of Chicago, 1154 Ill. App. 578 (Ill. 1910).
However, a city and a property owner abutting
a street may be able to contract for the closure of
a street in which the utility infrastructure would
remain in the ground without compensation of the
property owner by the city for the taking of the
property. In Knoxville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. City
of Knoxville, 284 S.W.866 (1925), the Court upheld
a contract under which provided for the city and
a railroad to share the cost of the construction of
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a viaduct over the railroad, and the city to close a
street. The Court noted the provisions in the city’s
charter authorizing it to open and vacate streets,
and to enter into contracts, and reasoned that
The city can certainly make a valid contract
for the improvement of a street or the
laying of a sidewalk. With equal certainty
for a valuable consideration the city council
could contract for the opening of
a street when a street would be for a public
purpose. For a like reason a contract for
the abolishment of a street or a part thereof
is valid when the contract is supported
by valuable consideration and the
abolishment is for a public purpose
[At 153 Tenn. 536, 569].
The conditions under which such a contract would
meet the “public purpose” test would undoubtedly
depend upon all the facts in each case.
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